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CAUTION! HOT BALLOT: EXAMINING  
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN  
CHAMNESS V. BOWEN 
Leah Johannesson 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Michael Chamness was a long-shot candidate.1 He ran in 
California’s 36th congressional district election on May 17, 2011, 
and appeared on the primary election ballot as having “No Party 
Preference.”2 Although his voter registration form stated his 
membership in the Coffee Party,3 California’s election law 
foreclosed him from stating that preference on the ballot.4 Indeed, 
“the ballot . . . is the last thing the voter sees before he makes his 
choice,” and party preference designations provide an important 
voting cue.5 Before the election, Chamness filed suit, alleging that 
the law, Senate Bill 6 (SB 6), violated his First Amendment rights by 
forcing him to indicate that he had no party preference.6 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science, 
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. Thank you to Professor Jessica A. 
Levinson for teaching me how to think about campaign-finance law, for her guidance and support 
through law school, and for her feedback on this Comment. And thank you to the editors and 
staffers of Volume 47 and 48 of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their work on this 
issue. 
 1. In his candidate statement, Chamness implored voters, “So I ask for your vote, but 
realize it’s a long shot.” Michael Chamness, Chamness for Congress Message, SMART VOTER 
(March 2011), http://www.smartvoter.org/2011/05/17/ca/la/vote/chamness_m/paper1.html. 
 2. Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 3. Chamness, supra note 1. The Coffee Party USA describes itself as “a grassroots, non-
partisan movement that aims to restore the principles and spirit of democracy in America.” Who 
We Are, THE COFFEE PARTY USA, http://www.coffeepartyusa.com/about (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013). The Coffee Party operates independently of political parties and does not endorse 
candidates. Id. 
 4. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012). 
 5. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 532 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see Rosen v. 
Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining that “party candidates are afforded a 
‘voting cue’ on the ballot in the form of a party label which research indicates is the most 
significant determinant of voting behavior”). 
 6. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114, 1116; see also Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief at 2, 13–15, Chamness v. Bowen, No. CV 11-01479 ODW (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 
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When the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the court rejected 
Chamness’s First Amendment claim and upheld the law requiring 
him to choose the ballot label “No Party Preference” or a blank 
space, ruling that the law was reasonably related to achieving the 
state’s interest in regulating elections.7 The court explained that 
strict-scrutiny review, which requires the state to show that the law is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, did not 
apply.8 Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, voting regulations 
generally do not receive strict-scrutiny review.9 
However, this Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit should 
have applied strict scrutiny to Chamness’s claim. Part II of this 
Comment discusses the factual and procedural background of the 
case, and Part III sets forth the court’s reasoning. Part IV will briefly 
discuss United States Supreme Court jurisprudence in ballot-access 
cases. Next, Part V argues that (1) the law at issue, SB 6, severely 
burdened candidates and voters’ First Amendment rights; and (2) the 
state’s interests, relied on in the opinion, are likely not sufficiently 
compelling to justify this burden. Part V also highlights possible 
challenges to SB 6. Lastly, Part VI concludes that applying strict 
scrutiny offers warranted constitutional protection for candidates and 
voters. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The California Legislature enacted SB 6 to implement 
Proposition 14, which created the open primary, top-two electoral 
system in California.10 When Chamness ran for office, SB 6 limited 
primary election candidates to three options for party preference 
designations: candidates could (1) designate their political party 
preference; (2) state “No Party Preference”; or (3) opt to leave the 
party preference space blank.11 California Secretary of State Debra 
Bowen interpreted “political party” to mean a qualified political 
 
2011) (alleging that “minor-party candidates are forced to falsely state on the ballot that they have 
‘No Party Preference’” in violation of the United States Constitution). 
 7. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116. 
 8. Id. at 1116–19. 
 9. Id. at 1116 (citing Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 10. Id. at 1113; Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act and Voter-Nominated Offices, 
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/statewide 
-elections/2012-primary/new-open-primary-info.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). Proposition 14 
has been codified as article II, sections 5 and 6, of the California Constitution. . 
 11. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012). 
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party.12 Thus, candidates may only designate a preference for 
qualified political parties, such as the Democratic or Republican 
Parties.13 Conversely, at the time of the contested election, 
candidates who preferred a non-qualified political party could only 
state “No Party Preference” or leave the party preference space 
blank.14 
Michael Chamness ran for office in California’s 36th 
congressional district on May 17, 2011.15 He sought to designate 
himself as an Independent by using the label “Independent” in the 
party preference space.16 Instead, he appeared on the ballot with “No 
Party Preference” next to his name because he did not designate a 
preference for a qualified political party.17 
On February 17, 2011, Chamness brought suit against Secretary 
Bowen and Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk 
Dean C. Logan, challenging the constitutionality of SB 6.18 
Chamness alleged that the law violated his free-speech rights 
because it forced him to falsely state that he had no party 
preference.19 In fact, he had a party preference: the Coffee Party.20 
Arguably, he could have opted to leave the party preference 
space blank, and he would not have been forced to state anything. 
However, on appeal, he maintained that the blank space option did 
not present a constitutionally permissible alternative because 
candidates who prefer a qualified party can designate their party 
preference, while Chamness, a candidate who identified with a minor 
 
 12. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1113. For a political party to become a qualified political party, 
the party must meet conditions set forth in California Elections Code section 5100.  
 13. ELEC. § 13105(a). For a list of additional qualified political parties, see Qualified 
Political Parties for the June 3, 2014, Primary Election, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE 
DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/political-parties/qualified-political-party.htm 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013). When Chamness ran for office, California had six qualified political 
parties. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1113. 
 14. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1113. 
 15. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief at 11, Chamness, 722 F.3d 1110 (No. 11-56449). 
 16. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114 n.2. 
 17. Id. at 1114. “[H]e appeared on the ballot as: 
MICHAEL CHAMNESS 
No Party Preference 
Non-profit Organization Consultant” 
Id.; see also ELEC. § 13105(a) (“If the candidate designates no [qualified] political party, the 
phrase ‘No Party Preference’ shall be printed instead of the party preference identification.”). 
 18. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114; Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra 
note 6, at 1, 13.  
 19. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 6, at 2, 13–15. 
 20. See Chamness, supra note 1. 
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party, could not.21 
On August 23, 2011, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.22 Chamness appealed, arguing 
in part that the law denied him an accurate ballot label and thereby 
severely burdened his First Amendment rights.23 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments and affirmed the district 
court’s ruling.24 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Ninth Circuit held that Chamness “failed to establish that 
SB 6 severely burdened his rights.”25 According to the court, 
Chamness did not explain how the regulation hindered the specific 
message that he wished to convey, in part because he failed to 
demonstrate that “Independent” and “No Party Preference” conveyed 
different meanings.26 Specifically, he did not establish that the “No 
Party Preference” label created “negative connotations even to well-
informed voters.”27 Furthermore, if Chamness thought the “No Party 
Preference” label harmed his candidacy, the court explained, he 
could have left the party preference space blank.28 Additionally, the 
court held that the regulation was “viewpoint neutral as to the 
required term ‘No Party Preference,’” because the law banned the 
term “Independent” for all candidates.29 For these reasons, the court 
concluded that the burden on speech was slight.30 
Because the burden was slight, the court did not apply strict 
scrutiny.31 Rather, the court examined whether the state’s regulatory 
interests justified the slight speech burden that SB 6 imposed on 
candidates desiring the designation “Independent.”32 The court 
 
 21. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, supra note 15, at 38 n.152. 
 22. Chamness v. Bowen, No. CV 11-01479 ODW (FFMx), 2011 WL 3021492, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2011), aff’d, 722 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013). The court also granted summary 
judgment in favor of intervener-defendants California Independent Voter Project, Abel 
Maldonado, and Californians to Defend the Open Primary. Id. 
 23. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116; Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, supra note 15, at 26–30. 
 24. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1122. 
 25. Id. at 1116. 
 26. Id. at 1117–18. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1118. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. 
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explained that “[n]ondiscriminatory restrictions that impose a lesser 
burden on speech rights need only be reasonably related to achieving 
the state’s important regulatory interests.”33 The court concluded that 
the state’s interests in preventing voter confusion and managing its 
ballots justified the slight burden on First Amendment rights.34 
Notably, the court treated Chamness as a “genuine 
[I]ndependent.”35 As stated by Richard Winger, the editor and 
publisher of Ballot Access News, in Chamness’s Complaint, 
Chamness “wanted the label ‘[I]ndependent[,]’” but “[i]n later briefs 
he suggested that he really want[ed] the label ‘Coffee Party.’”36 The 
court did not address whether he wanted a label for a non-qualified 
political party and instead expressed “no views as to the validity of 
California’s restriction against stating preferences for non-qualified 
parties.”37 
After the district court entered judgment, and before the Ninth 
Circuit heard the case, California removed the blank space option 
from section 13105(a) of the California Election Code.38 Thus, 
candidates can no longer opt to leave the party preference space 
blank.39 The court explained that Chamness did not argue “that the 
presence or absence of the blank space option” affected the law’s 
constitutionality and “expressed[ed] no view as to whether the 
removal of the blank space option compels speech by requiring 
candidates who prefer a non-qualified party to falsely state that they 
have no party preference.”40 In other words, the Ninth Circuit did not 
address how removal of the blank space option may affect the law’s 
constitutionality, because, according to the court, Chamness only 




 33. Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 
F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 34. Id. at 1118–19. 
 35. Richard Winger, Independent Candidate Loses in Ninth Circuit, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, 
Aug. 2013, at 2; see also Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114 n.2 (“As in his complaint, Chamness 
argues on appeal only that he wished to designate himself ‘Independent’ on the primary election 
ballot, not that he must be allowed to identify himself as a member of the ‘Coffee Party.’”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118 n.5. 
 38. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2012); Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4. 
 39. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2012); Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4. 
 40. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4. 
 41. Id. 
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IV.  THE CURRENT TEST 
Whether a ballot access restriction imposes a severe burden or a 
reasonable, non-discriminatory burden dictates the level of scrutiny 
employed by the court.42 If the state law imposes a severe burden on 
the right to vote and associate, the court will apply strict scrutiny.43 
Under this standard, the court must determine whether the ballot 
access restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.44 For example, in Williams v. Rhodes,45 the 
Supreme Court held that election laws that kept minor political 
parties off of the ballot imposed severe burdens on the right to vote 
and the right to associate.46 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court 
concluded that the state failed to demonstrate any “compelling 
interest” that would justify those burdens.47 Williams has been 
described as the Supreme Court’s high-water mark for protecting 
ballot access by minor parties.48 
Conversely, regulations that impose a lesser burden on First 
Amendment rights trigger a lower level of scrutiny.49 For example, in 
Anderson v. Celebrezze,50 the Supreme Court held that a statute 
requiring an independent candidate for President to adhere to an 
early filing deadline unconstitutionally burdened voting and 
associational rights of the independent candidate’s supporters.51 
Anderson instructs:  
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude 
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
 
 42. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 43. See id.; Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1117. 
 44. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116. 
 45. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
 46. Id. at 26, 30–31. 
 47. Id. at 31; Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties 
Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 186 (1991) (discussing how Williams applied a 
“rigorous strict scrutiny standard”). 
 48. Jessica A. Levinson, Is the Party Over? Examining the Constitutionality of Proposition 
14 as It Relates to Ballot Access for Minor Parties, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 463, 479 (2011); see 
also Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme Court’s 
Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1288 (2005) (“The Court’s first major foray 
into the field of ballot-access was also the high-water mark of protection afforded third-party 
challengers.”). 
 49. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 50. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 51. Id. at 805–06. 
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vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise 
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court 
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each 
of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which 
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing 
court in a position to decide whether the challenged 
provision is unconstitutional.52 
This balancing test has been likened to intermediate scrutiny.53 
Notably, the Supreme Court in Anderson protected ballot access for 
Independent candidates.54 However, subsequent cases employing this 
lower level of scrutiny have upheld ballot restrictions as reasonably 
related to a state’s regulatory interests.55 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Chamness court should have applied strict scrutiny to 
Chamness’s claim. Contrary to the court’s finding, SB 6 heavily 
burdened Chamness’s rights and the rights of voters to associate for 
the advancement of political beliefs, which triggers strict scrutiny. 
Additionally, the court overestimated the importance of the 
government interests relied on in the opinion, which likely do not 
justify the heavy burden on First Amendment rights. Had the court 
applied strict scrutiny and expressed a view on California’s disparate 
treatment of candidates who prefer non-qualified political parties, the 
constitutionality of SB 6 would likely have been a closer question. 
 
 
 52. Id. at 789. 
 53. Levinson, supra note 48, at 493. 
 54. Anderson, 460 U.S at 805–06. 
 55. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369–70 (1997) (“[T]he burdens 
Minnesota’s fusion ban imposes on the New Party’s associational rights are justified by 
‘correspondingly weighty’ valid state interests in ballot integrity and political stability.”); see also 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 440 (1992) (“[L]egitimate interests asserted by the State 
are sufficient to outweigh the limited burden that the write-in voting ban imposes upon Hawaii’s 
voters.”). 
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A.  SB 6 Imposes a Severe Burden on  
Candidates’ and Voters’ Rights to Associate  
for the Advancement of Political Beliefs 
First, SB 6 impinges on candidates’ associational rights because 
it treats candidates with political preferences “outside the existing 
political parties” differently from candidates with qualified party 
preferences.56 In Anderson, the Supreme Court held: “[A] burden 
that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on 
independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational 
choices protected by the First Amendment.”57 But in Chamness, the 
court found that SB 6 treated all candidates equally: it allowed all 
candidates to put their name on the primary ballot, and it prohibited 
all candidates from using the label “Independent.”58 However, SB 6 
allows only a certain group of candidates, those that prefer qualified 
parties, to appear on the primary ballot with an affirmative party 
preference label.59 This results in a recognition advantage for those 
who prefer qualified parties.60 Accordingly, the burden falls 
unequally on candidates who prefer non-qualified parties, 
necessitating heightened review.61 
Second, and more importantly,62 SB 6 infringes on voters’ rights 
to associate and effectively vote. When viewing the primary election 
ballot, non-qualified party voters cannot determine which candidates 
identify with their specific interests, whereas qualified party voters 
can.63 In Anderson v. Martin,64 the Supreme Court recognized the 
importance of ballot labels attached to a candidate’s name, as the 
state places a label on a candidate “at the most crucial stage in the 
electoral processthe instant before the vote is cast.”65 Ballot labels 
help voters associate with their candidates of choice and cast 
 
 56. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793–94 (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 57. Id. at 793–94. 
 58. Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 59. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105(a) (West 2011) (amended 2012). 
 60. See Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1992); Levinson, supra note 48, at 509. 
 61. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793. 
 62. E.g., id. at 794 (emphasizing the “particular importance” of a law’s effect on voters’ 
associational rights). 
 63. See Bachrach v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 415 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Mass. 1981). 
 64. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). 
 65. Id. at 402 (holding that the designation of a candidate’s race on the ballot violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
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meaningful votes that reflect their ideology or affiliation.66 In 
Williams, the Supreme Court held that the right to associate and the 
right to effectively vote rank “among our most precious freedoms”;67 
and thus, here, the court should apply strict scrutiny. 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit declined to assume harm to 
voters’ rights “in the absence of evidence.”68 As the court explained, 
Chamness did not provide empirical evidence to establish a 
difference between “Independent” and “No Party Preference.”69 
Furthermore, he did not establish that voters would vote differently 
based on the labels.70 Because the court lacked evidence, it assumed 
that “the ballot was presented to a well-informed electorate” who 
understood California’s ballot labels.71 The court indicated that it 
required evidence proving a “distinction in likely impact between 
‘Independent’ on the one hand, and ‘No Party Preference,’ when 
pitted against other ‘preference’ designations for California’s six 
qualified parties.”72 Thus, the court’s opinion may have been 
different if it had had such evidence. 
Additionally, the Chamness court held that its decision did not 
conflict with the Sixth Circuit case, Rosen v. Brown.73 In Rosen, the 
Sixth Circuit invalidated a law that prohibited a non-party candidate 
from having the ballot designation “Independent” or “Independent 
candidate” by his name on a general election ballot, but provided 
labels for Democratic and Republican candidates.74 There, non-party 
candidates secured a position on the ballot through an independent 
candidate’s nominating petition.75 The Rosen court, citing expert 
testimony, found that “[w]ithout a designation next to an 
Independent’s name on the ballot, the voter has no clue as to what 
the candidate stands for.”76  
 
 66. Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Voting studies conducted since 
1940 indicated that party identification is the single most important influence on political 
opinions and voting.”). 
 67. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968). 
 68. Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1118 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
454–55 (2008)). 
 72. See id. at 1120. 
 73. Id.; Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 74. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 177–78. 
 75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (West 2013); Rosen, 970 F.2d at 171. 
 76. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172. 
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The Ninth Circuit held that Chamness could not rely on Rosen.77 
Unlike the plaintiff in Rosen, Chamness did not present evidence to 
establish a difference between the meaning of “Independent” and 
“No Party Preference.”78 Also, the specific party labels disputed in 
Rosen (“Independent” and no designation versus “Democrat,” or 
“Republican”) differed from the party labels disputed in Chamness 
(“Independent” and “No Party Preference” versus qualified party 
preference designations).79 
Admittedly, in contrast to the Independent candidates in Rosen, 
Chamness could use a label: “No Party Preference.” However, the 
“No Party Preference” label inaccurately captured Chamness’s party 
preference and therefore did not provide a meaningful voting cue to 
voters.80 Furthermore, the studies and expert testimony in Rosen 
discussed the general importance of ballot labels, including the 
“Independent” label.81 
Moreover, the court should not require proof to find that 
designations influence the way voters cast their votes. In Washington 
State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,82 where the 
Supreme Court rejected a political party’s challenge to the state’s 
open-primary, top-two electoral system,83 Chief Justice Roberts 
explained in his concurring opinion that he would not require 
political parties to establish voter perception through studies.84 In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued, “It does not take a study to 
establish that when statements of party connection are the sole 
 
 77. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1120. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. Lastly, unlike the legislators in Rosen who enacted the law to preserve political 
dominance of the Democratic and Republican Parties, the Chamness court held, “There does not 
appear to be any legitimate argument that the law in this case seeks to insulate any political party 
or parties from competition.” Id. 
 80. See Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172; Chamness, supra note 1. 
 81. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 172–73. However, the Rosen court stressed its reliance on evidence in 
the form of expert testimony. The Rosen court distinguished the Fifth Circuit case Dart v. Brown, 
which upheld a law that prevented minor-party candidates from stating their party affiliation on 
the ballot. 717 F.2d 1491 (5th Cir. 1983). The Rosen court explained that the Fifth Circuit in Dart 
recognized that a candidate’s lack of party affiliation on the ballot could impair voters’ rights, but 
did not have evidence demonstrating such impairment. Rosen, 970 F.2d at 176. The Rosen court 
further explained that, unlike the Dart court, it had such evidence. Id. 
 82. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
 83. Id. at 458–59. 
 84. Id. at 461–62 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Nothing in my analysis requires the parties to 
produce studies regarding voter perceptions on [how voters interpret candidates’ designations], 
but I would wait to see what the ballot says before deciding whether it is unconstitutional.”). 
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information listed next to candidate names on the ballot, those 
statements will affect voters’ perceptions of what the candidates 
stand for, what the party stands for, and whom they should elect.”85 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court case Bachrach v. Secretary 
of Commonwealth86 is also instructive. In Bachrach, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and held that a 
law prohibiting the ballot label “Independent” and instead requiring 
candidates to state “Unenrolled” violated constitutional rights.87 
Without citing empirical evidence, the court declared, “Unenrolled is 
hardly a rallying cry” and indicated that the label “would have a 
negative connotation for voters.”88 Like “Unenrolled” in Bachrach, 
“No Party Preference” in Chamness could create a similar, negative 
connotation for voters.89 
B.  The State’s Interests Likely  
Do Not Justify SB 6 
The Ninth Circuit held that SB 6 “is sufficiently supported by 
the state’s important regulatory interests” in preventing voter 
confusion and managing its ballots.90 But when applying strict 
scrutiny, the court must determine whether the law furthers a 
compelling state interest.91 Indeed, government interests rarely 
survive strict-scrutiny review.92 
First, the state’s interest in preventing voter confusion is weak at 
best. The court explained that voters might confuse “Independent” 
and the qualified “American Independent Party,” even though the 
court assumed a well-informed electorate earlier in its opinion.93 “No 
Party Preference” possibly misleads voters, because the label 
 
 85. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 86. 415 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 1981). 
 87. Id. at 836–37. 
 88. Id. at 836. 
 89. See Oral Argument at 09:09–10:15, Chamness v. Bowen, 722 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 11-56303), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000010402. 
 90. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118–19. The court did not rely on the government’s asserted 
“‘interest in maintaining the distinction between qualified political parties and nonqualified 
political bodies’ as justifying the ‘No Party Preference’ language.” Id. at 1118 n.5. 
 91. Id. at 1116.  
 92. “Only rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny. As one commentator 
observed, strict-scrutiny review is ‘strict’ in theory but usually ‘fatal’ in fact.” Bernal v. Fainter, 
467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6 (1984) (citing Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). 
 93. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118. 
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actually means no qualified party preference.94 Additionally, the law 
denies voters information about candidates, because candidates who 
prefer non-qualified parties cannot designate their actual party 
preference on the ballot. Indeed, “[a] State’s claim that it is 
enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by 
restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with 
some skepticism.”95 A ballot label that designates the candidate’s 
actual party preference would lead to more information—rather than 
create confusion—by providing voters with an important voting cue 
about candidates.96 
Granted, Chamness’s own example presents a case of possible 
voter confusion. He ran for office affiliated with the Coffee Party,97 
but sought the label “Independent” on the ballot.98 This could 
confuse voters: is he an independent candidate or does he prefer the 
Coffee Party? But the potential for voter confusion seems greater in a 
system that denies information, instead of in a system that allows 
voters to judge for themselves the candidate’s designation.99 Again, 
the state’s claim regarding voter confusion should be viewed with 
skepticism.100 
Second, the state’s interest in managing its ballots is slightly 
more compelling, but likely not sufficient to survive strict 
scrutiny.101 As the Chamness court warned, questionable self-
designations would require the state to make “case-by-case 
governmental decisions regarding the acceptability of various self-
designations.”102 Perhaps the state tried to minimize this type of 
decision making by specifying a mechanical scheme for 
designations.103 
On the other hand, the state could manage its ballots while 
 
 94. See Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 31:00.  
 95. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986)). 
 96. Levinson, supra note 48, at 504, 509. 
 97. Chamness, supra note 1. 
 98. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1114. 
 99. Levinson, supra note 48, at 504. 
 100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 101. See Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118. 
 102. Id. at 1119.  
 103. See Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 16:30. However, Washington state makes those 
decisions, as it allows candidates up to sixteen characters to designate their political party 
preference, and provides for when the filing officer may intervene to edit, reject, or replace a 
candidate’s self-designation. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 434-215-120 (2008). 
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offering more than a small number of prescribed labels. The state 
could avoid “questionable self-designation”104 with a less 
burdensome regulation by allowing candidates to designate 
themselves as preferring a non-qualified political party. For example, 
in Rubin v. City of Santa Monica,105 the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
California regulation that allowed candidates to designate their 
occupations while prohibiting non-occupational, status 
designations.106 Here, even if a new California regulation offered 
more than a small number of prescribed labels, candidates would still 
face restrictions like those seen in Rubin. The restrictions, in turn, 
could limit candidates’ choice of designation and preclude candidates 
from using the designation they feel best promotes their 
candidacy.107 A less burdensome regulation could even exclude 
Chamness from stating the term “Independent” because that label 
does not indicate preference for a non-qualified party.108 
Overall, the state’s interests relied on in Chamness likely do not 
survive strict-scrutiny review.  
C.  This Case Provides Significant Guidance  
to Future Challengers 
After the election at issue in Chamness, the state eliminated the 
blank space option.109 In Chamness, the Ninth Circuit relied on the 
blank space option to conclude that the burden on Chamness’s 
speech was slight.110 Specifically, the court maintained that if 
Chamness disagreed with the message that “No Party Preference” 
conveyed, he could have opted for the blank space option.111 Now, 
this is no longer the case, as candidates who prefer a non-qualified 
political party must state “Party Preference: None,”112 even if they 
disagree with the message. Thus, future challengers may have a 
stronger claim that the law impermissibly compels speech and 
 
 104. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1119. 
 105. 308 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 106. Id. at 1015 (holding that ballot regulation prohibiting “status” designations did not 
violate candidate’s free speech rights). 
 107. See Oral Argument, supra note 89, at 14:35. 
 108. See Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118 n.5 (explaining that Chamness did “not contend that 
‘Independent’ is a political party”). 
 109. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 13105 (West 2012). 
 110. Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1118, 1119. 
 111. Id. at 1118. 
 112. ELEC. § 13105. 
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therefore severely burdens their First Amendment rights.113 
Chamness demonstrates the Ninth Circuit’s current requirement 
that the challenger must introduce empirical evidence for the court to 
find a severe burden on First Amendment rights. Specifically, the 
Ninth Circuit seems to require evidence demonstrating the difference 
between the desired label “I prefer the [non-qualified] party” and the 
current label “Party Preference: None,” when presented against 
preference designations for qualified parties.114 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Like Chamness’s candidacy, this was a long-shot case. Though 
relying on precedent, which rarely subjects voting regulations to 
strict scrutiny,115 the Ninth Circuit underestimated the rights at stake 
and overestimated the government’s interests.116 The rights at stake 
are critical to democracy: the right to associate for the advancement 
of political beliefs and the right to meaningfully vote.117 Thus, the 




 113. See Chamness, 722 F.3d at 1116 n.4. 
 114. See id. at 1120. 
 115. Id. at 1116 (citing Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 116. See supra Parts III, V.A–B. 
 117. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968). 
